

CUBAN INVASION

TWO VIEWS on the

Through the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon, the U.S. had done everything to assure success short of providing an air cover or sending in the Marines. The invaders—all Cubans—were trained by the U.S., supplied by the U.S., and dispatched by the U.S. to carry out a plan written by U.S. military experts. President Kennedy knew D-day in advance, and had approved.

At the six main training bases in Guatemala, and at staging bases at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, and tiny Swan Island off the Honduran coast, fish were already rising. In recent weeks, the equivalent of 50 freight carloads of aerial bombs, rockets, ammunition and firearms was airlifted into Puerto Cabezas by unmarked U.S. C-54s, C-46s and C-47s, in such quantities that on some days last month planes required momentary stacking. D.

known. The CIA and the Pentagon, which sponsored and embarked the exile army, obviously were under instructions to keep their lips zipped tight. But

The CIA picked the Revolutionary Democratic Front (*Frente*), a fragile union of five organizations that held much the same point of view as their "coordinator," Manuel Antonio (Tony) Varona, 52—that "the need for agrarian reform in Cuba is a myth." The land expropriated by Castro, says Varona, onetime head of the old-line *Auténtico* Party, should be returned to its original owners except for "about 15%" that is not productive. Lat-

Money & Bases. The CIA's decision against them quickly became apparent to Manolo Ray and the M.R.P. Organized into cells to spread sabotage across Cuba, the M.R.P. men say they asked many times for explosives and boats to get the stuff ashore, but were usually waved aside. But the *Frente* was becoming a big enterprise. Estimates of how much money was pumped into the *Frente* for recruiting centers and other political expenses vary from \$130,000 monthly to a high of \$520,000 last December. As the plans for a frontal invasion took shape, CIA men went to Guatemala and arranged with Rancher-Businessman Roberto Alejos* to use three of his properties—coffee plantations named Helvetia and La Suiza near the town of Retalhuleu, and a cotton farm called San José Buenavista, 35 miles from the Pacific port of San José—as camps to train an army of invasion ("No charge," said Alejos. "Just remember me in Havana"). Through Alejos, the CIA also arranged a \$1,000,000 hurry-up surfacing of a 5,000-ft. airstrip at Retalhuleu. Starting in September, an airlift of U.S. planes shuttled between recruiting centers in Florida and the Guatemalan camps, bringing in the first of more than 2,000 combat trainees. Later, the recruits got rugged training in jungle, commando and night fighting techniques from a dozen U.S. experts and one Filipino instructor. They learned to use the most modern U.S. weapons—bazookas, recoilless can-

non, machine guns. So strict was security that only a few officer B-26 pilots were allowed to visit nearby towns; infantry recruits were confined to camp. In-

In the midst of the *Frente* buildup, the underground sabotage operations of the M.R.P. inside Cuba came almost to a halt for lack of matériel. In November, Manolo Ray sneaked out of Cuba to the U.S., hoping to win some support. Anxious to collect all anti-Castro organizations under one umbrella, the CIA offered to help M.R.P. on condition that it join Varona's *Frente*. The M.R.P. refused. The M.R.P. asked that arms be dropped to guerrillas in Escambray. The CIA, say the exiles, finally agreed, but on condition that the weapons be stamped with the *Frente's* initials. The M.R.P. asked for 15 minutes' broadcasting time on the CIA-controlled radio station on Swan Island. Again, they say, Bender agreed, but insisted that a CIA man direct the program.

Who & What For? Varona's *Frente* had its own complaints about the CIA, despite all the help the *Frente* was getting. "They want to know everything," complained one *Frente* leader. "Suppose you ask for 100 rifles. They want to know to whom, what for, where they will be used—in triplicate." Exiles also say that they were subjected to lie-detector tests before going to camps (sample question: Have you had homosexual relations?) and were threatened with deportation or detention camps at McAllen, Texas, if they got out of line. They say that in the final stages, the Pentagon moved in to take direct control of the operation. The *Frente* representative was removed when he tried to exert some authority, and the Batista followers in the camps moved toward the leadership, working with a militant young opportunist named Manuel Artime, 28, onetime Catholic student leader at Havana University and a *Frente* subchief who schemed to leapfrog into supreme power. When one *Frente* man mentioned the Batista recruits to a U.S. colonel, the colo-

nel dismissed the matter with "they're anti-Communists, aren't they?"

Increasingly, the *Frente* and the M.R.P. leaders complained to intimates that the liberation of Cuba was no longer in their hands. "The U.S. has taken over, and they are owners, not allies," one confided. "The attack is coming soon. I don't know exactly when; it's no longer our decision. They plan to establish a beachhead, establish there a government-in-arms, hold air control, and move for the interior." On a map he pointed to a spot in Las Villas province, close to the Bay of Pigs.

All Together. By the middle of February, an urgent and anxious atmosphere settled over the exile groups. CIA agent Bender called representatives of the *Frente* and M.R.P. together in Washington, told them to join forces and stop squabbling about politics. He is said to have handed them a list of 26 Cubans, told them to choose ten to participate in the selection of a Cuban provisional President. The Cubans looked at Bender's list, say that they failed to recognize six of the names, refused.

Two weeks later, the Cubans got together independently for four days in Room 123 of Manhattan's Hotel Commodore, where they finally agreed to cooperate. The pact was sealed in a banquet room of the Skyway Motel, Miami. There, say the exiles, a CIA agent named Carr called for "democratic agreement of all present in order to choose a chief or President, who would head the provisional government later." The choice of the Revolutionary Council, as the joint *Frente*-M.R.P. group was named; José Miró Cardona, a man whose career has been based on mediation and compromise.

... Cuban soil. When President Kennedy also agreed on the timing, it was Artime who was permitted to break the news for the new Cuba, while his fellow council members—including Miró—were held incommunicado by the CIA.

MAX SHACHTMAN

SPEECH ON THE CUBAN INVASION * BERKELEY

HAL DRAPER

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

A DISCUSSION PAMPHLET

TWENTY-FIVE CENTS

The clippings reproduced above are highlights from TIME magazine, April 28, 1961

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NOTE

The speech by Max Shachtman on the Cuban invasion was delivered in Berkeley on Tuesday evening, April 18, 1961, at a public meeting sponsored by the East Bay Local of the Socialist Party. The last part of the presentation, and all of the summary made in reply to discussion from the floor, are given here, as transcribed from the tape-recording made at the meeting.

The tape of the summary speech was technically poor, transcription was very difficult, and a few words and phrases could not be deciphered from the tape, mostly occurring in the course of low, rapid parenthetical remarks. These are indicated here by [...] or a longer row of bracketed dots. Brackets around words or phrases indicate uncertain transcription. Other notes in the transcription are self-explanatory.

The presentation, on the general situation in Cuba, took over an hour and a half, and came to the question of the invasion (which had been launched the day before, at the point where the following text begins. This was preceded by a long account and discussion of the Batista regime and the social and economic forces in Cuba leading up to its overthrow, and the earlier acts and aims of the Castro revolution; finally, the growing power of the Communists in the regime, its anti-democratic development, and the danger of a Communist take-over. Thus, the following pages present the whole of Shachtman's discussion of the Cuban invasion itself.

I should add that Shachtman has had no connection with the production of this pamphlet, which is issued entirely on my own responsibility.

-- H. D.

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May 1961

MAX SHACHTMAN

PRESENTATION

How close this development has come to the finish that a totalitarian victory would represent, and how promising are the prospects of a reversal of the trend in the Cuban revolution--these are questions that may be on the verge of decision as we are sitting here. The invasion of the forces of the Revolutionary Council, as it is called, is now under way, and the two are locked in combat. What the actual development is down there militarily, I do not know. I start my road to knowledge by ignoring, by not accepting as true automatically, all the reports that are printed in the press, that are broadcast by the Revolutionary Council or that are broadcast from Havana. In war in general, we have learned, the communiqués of the contending camps should be taken with barrels and barrels of salt, and in this particular form of war whole mines of salt have to be stripped. I'm not a military expert, I regret to say; I'm not always sure what end of the gun to hold, even, and it is not to me a military problem. At least, that is not my concern at the present moment. Even if it were, I'm afraid I could not throw even a smidgeon of light on it.

I am considering the problem from a different angle: not to approve, not to condemn, so much, but to try to understand how this tragic situation has unfolded. A civil war for any country is a tragic situation. The invasion is on because the dualism of the revolution that made itself evident in the Cuban revolution inevitably produced a reaction.

One was to restore the old regime of Batista. The Batistaists in Cuba--those who fled or those who hid--that's what they want. Undoubtedly some elements, many elements in the United States, or those in authority and power and influence, want the same thing. That's one reaction to the regime, naturally. The Batistaists were thrown out of power, dispossessed of all power--naturally they want it back.

The other is increasingly--as defections came here, there and everywhere, those who remained silently in Cuba and those who fled abroad, primarily to the U.S.: Restore the old program of the July 26 Movement--land to the peasants, freedom in general for the people, and against all those monstrosities that they suffered under in Cuba, against their manifestation in any form and to any degree again, with all agreed more or less on the modernization of the economy. And this latter is represented, so far as I am able to tell from study and from discussions with Cubans--are represented by three more or less discernible tendencies.

There are those who represent the July 26 Movement people who broke with the regime and remained July 26 people, so to speak, and whose slogan very often is Fidelism without Communism; that is, they want the restoration of the original program of Fidel without the association with the Communists, which they fear, which they resist, which they do not want.

Then there is an element which fought Castro all the time, which was not directly associated with the Fidel movement, the July 26 Movement, when it was in struggle, because of the condescending attitude (to put it very mildly) of the July 26 people towards the trade unions. These are the people who

are in the Cuban trade unions, leaders of the Cuban trade unions, who fought against Castro, who were in prison under Castro, were tortured under Castro, who helped to overthrow Castro [sic; = Batista] in the last stages, and who were forced to flee when the Communists were helped to oust them from power, from official positions, from influence in the trade unions. These are men who-- I can give you only my personal judgment on them, to the extent that you find that at all interesting--these are men with whom I have spoken, who showed me their literature, which I was able to read, who made a most favorable and strong impression upon me. It goes without saying that they are not Batistaists--they are people with demonstrable records, not fabricated ones, records of struggle against Batista and victimization under Batista. They don't want a Communist regime there or what they consider a Communist regime or the trend of the Castro movement toward a Communist regime. That's the second group.

And because-- I do not hesitate to say this, comrades and friends, because of the tremendous conviction that I have acquired in the course of the last decade after seeing what happened to the trade union movement in all sorts of countries, not just capitalist countries, where they are made a mere branch of the government, which can order them around this way and that way, which can put leaders in or take leaders out, or remove leaders altogether, I have a profound conviction that democracy is not possible in any form--bourgeois democracy, capitalist democracy, or socialist democracy--without free trade unions, trade unions free to decide for themselves, rightly or wrongly, and who can be had to change their minds only by persuasion and not by police clubs.

And then there is a third element, so far as I can judge, of friends or supporters of the revolution or even the July 26 Movement who thought that even the July 26 program went a little too far, and certainly that everything that was done since, in the great reforms that Castro did introduce and the great improvements he did introduce, without question, in the early period and by which he earned so much popular support in the early period--certainly went too far, and who undoubtedly feel--it would be silly to ignore that--that private ownership in most if not all fields should be restored in Cuba. They appear to be represented, again as far as I can learn from informed people, and not from superficial or trivial journalistic articles--they are represented by Jose Cardona, the first of the presidents in Cuba put into office by the Castro government, who broke with it, I believe, after some month or two or three.

The Revolutionary Council which has been established among all of them is, by virtue of the fact that they are all [creating] these movements and many minor movements in it, is filled with compromises or deliberate unclarity. If you and I have to get together on some document, so to speak, and we cannot find agreement, we will sometimes put the position so unclearly and so deliberately ambiguously as to permit the common issuing of a document, a statement, but which you can interpret your way and I can interpret my way at a later stage, so to speak. And that is particularly the case with the statement issued by the Council with regard to the expropriations. It allows it to be interpreted this way or this way depending on subsequent developments.

On the Revolutionary Council, in command appears to be--I do not know all the ins and outs of it, and that is not really the question--Cardona. And there is no doubt in my mind, by the way, that just as the U.S., based upon the CIA--that doesn't matter--just as the American administration, the Washington administration, has tried very much to keep clear of Batistaists, because it knows that with the Batistaists it is absolutely impossible to advance even an eighth of a millimeter in Cuba or anywhere in Latin America, so of the elements in the Revolutionary Council it is undoubtedly the case that the American authorities exerted maximum pressure, in exchange for the aid, financial and military, that was given to the Council, for the selection of Cardona as the principal spokesman for the movement. This undoubtedly does not contribute to the happiness of the other two elements in the Council of which I spoke, the dissident July 26 people and the trade-union people; but that is the situation as I understand it.

Which will assert itself? That is hard to say. Right now arms are talking, arms are talking in a very difficult, very complex situation. If Castro wins, it will undoubtedly show the depth of the hostility to the U.S., or anything associated with the U.S. or anything suspected of association with the U.S., a hostility generated at bottom by the U.S. administration itself--a fact that should never be lost to mind--and therefore a readiness for a passive, or if you will a reluctant, acceptance of the trend towards totalitarianism in Cuba. That's in the one case.

If Castro loses, it may reveal the depth of the opposition among the masses to the recent trend, an opposition that can only be masked but not eliminated by these massive parades of which the government people speak, and throw open again the question of the road for the Cuban revolution to take in its resumption: toward a democratic expansion of the revolution, which is one road; toward a stagnation, which is a possibility, as in some Latin American countries; or for a turning-back of the wheel in one, two or three stages, to the type of regime that we knew under Batista.

We here can't decide the outcome of the present invasion, I don't think; but we can and I feel that we must exert an influence on the thought and action of others so that they can exert an influence upon the government of the U.S. And that influence must be aimed above all--this I hold to just as firmly and steadfastly and uncompromisingly as I do to some of the other things I've said so dogmatically before--I feel dogmatically about them, that is, unyielding: No American intervention in Cuba! The hour has struck, whether we like it or not, where the Cuban people are deciding it for themselves, and they must be allowed in my opinion to decide it themselves and for themselves and by themselves; and that means: without any American armed intervention in Cuba, in any form. Because if that should occur, in my opinion, if everything is not lost then very close to everything is lost--not just for the U.S. but for Cuba as well.

Tragedy is multiplying tragedy in Cuba. The Castro regime, by denial of democratic rights and an increasing narrowing-down of democratic rights and possibilities, is paying for it the bitter price of a revolt, which became the only way in which others besides the complete and uncritical supporters of the Castro regime and the Communists, the only way in which others could make their criticisms or offer

an alternative. That's the fact. I don't see how I can blink it; I don't see how anyone else can blink it. Where elections become so a matter of contempt, where a decent, real consultation of the people is excluded, no other way is left, the other ways are forced.

The policy of our government toward Cuba contributed heavily to the gloomy trend away from the democratic revolution, and if a reversal in that trend, regardless of the outcome militarily and therefore governmentally, of the present fight is to be achieved in Cuba, we must have a reversal in our own policy, not just for today but for the whole next period. First, hands off Cuba; an absolute refrainment from any attempt to dictate to the Cuban people by American force, which is an outrage against democracy and against normal decent relations between nation to nation. To negotiate as equals for the restoration of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba; this regardless of the outcome militarily. For generous and meaningful economic and financial aid to Cuba, so that it is (a) not forced to rely upon its own resources, which are too slender, and (b) not forced to seek elsewhere, which means, in the present world, to seek from the Kremlin a substitute for that aid.

And fourth, I would say--and these are simply elementary considerations, not a whole elaborate program to solve every problem of Cuba--to renegotiate the Guantanamo Bay base with Cuba; because my feeling is that the big bulk--and this is granted by opponents as well as supporters of Castro--the big bulk of the Cuban people want the complete evacuation of the Guantanamo Bay base. I am myself unquestioningly for it. The U.S. cannot continue to impose upon Cuba a base which was negotiated under circumstances and with people, with Cubans, which no longer exists, and no longer has the respect of the Cuban people, and the circumstances under which it was signed no longer exist.

I do not make this survey of Cuban developments with joy. Like so many others, my heart and my hopes are, as they always were from the beginning and before even the name of Castro was heard of in this country widely, with the Cuban revolution and with the great program of freedom, independence and democracy and progress which to me are big things and not just ceremonial phrases, which the leaders of the revolution first pronounced, espoused and fought for; and it is with no joy that I, like some others, observed the growing degree to which this program was being abandoned month by month. I can't foretell, I have indicated, at this crucial moment the outcome of the clash which became inevitable. I have no doubt that many, perhaps most of the Castro supporters on the island are fighting for an independence and freedom under a regime which had already gone so far in destroying them, and I know too that many are fighting among the invading forces and in support of them on the island for an independence and freedom which may end in bitter disillusionment for them too. I cannot take courage--This is my unfortunate position, my unfortunate feeling--from the developments in Cuba.

In this cruel situation in which the Cuban people are the main ones to suffer, it may seem very easy for many to take sides with wholehearted and uncritical passion, and I would be the last one to deny that that is understandable and even natural, and even in a sense commendable, and I am not saying this disdainfully or condescendingly but because I know what that feeling is; and to believe that thereby the

problem is solved, and that the responsibility of every individual, who is after all called upon as an individual to take a position, that his responsibility is discharged. I myself do not find it so easy.

My sympathies--I don't even want to begin to conceal my sympathies--are primarily with these trade-union elements, the trade-union democrats, the trade-union revolutionists whom I met, whom I know, upon whom I have checked so to speak, about whose credentials I have inquired in sources and corners for which I have respect, and who represent trade-union militants like themselves, good stout working-class fighters on the island itself; and in the second place, with the July 26 people, who in their own way--not perhaps in my socialist way, not perhaps in my socialist reason--but in their own way, as revolutionary democrats, as good nationalists, lovers of their country as you love yours--were appalled by and then resisted the growth of the Communist influence there; because what that means, they know, and that I know too.

My hopes for their success--and I hope for their success, and their expansion of the program of the Cuban revolution--are however heavily influenced by my fears of the degree of power that may be exerted by conservative elements who are not few in number, and by their sponsors and guides, above all in the Washington administration, just as my hopes in the Castro regime itself were increasingly darkened by the growth of the Communist and anti-democratic forces that became increasingly dominant and apparent.

It's a heavy hour for the heart of everyone to whom socialism and freedom aren't just phrases, aren't just our substitute for July 4 phrases on July 4 celebrations in this country, but for whom they mean a new life and a new attitude toward life--a new man and a new attitude toward men. And I trust that in this hour that the forces that once proved irresistible in breaking the back of one tyranny in Cuba will not prove to be less effective in turning the helm of that revolution so that it can again sail in free and refreshing seas. For it is no exaggeration to say that all the Americas, we too, indeed all the world are watching anxiously for the outcome on which depends so much that we too, like the people of Cuba, cherish and aspire to attain. Thank you.

SUMMARY

... [There are some initial sentences, unclear on the tape, in which the speaker points out he is speaking only for himself, not for any official position.]

I am speaking on a subject that is exceedingly complicated. It may not be so complicated to you now. I hope it gets simpler and clearer and it moves in the right direction [...] but my own feeling now is that it will get more complicated. And it will

be less easy tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow to give an easy over-all answer. Individual aspects of the problem I can answer in my sleep, because I've been awake for so long that now it's automatic with me. And where they assume exceptionally complex forms, or forms that were not known before or were not experienced before in politics in general and in the socialist movement in particular, then in my old age, as I grow more senile and conservative I tend to be more prudent [...]

Now here's why I lean to the point of view that I expressed, and do not lean to the point of view that was expressed by other comrades or friends who are here or that was implied in some of the questions. Insofar as everyone here who took the floor abhorred the very idea of American intervention in Cuba, I'm not only with them, I not only have no difference with such persons, but I consider myself at one with them. And I'm especially happy that such a sentiment is expressed by comrades in the U.S., friends in the U.S., where it is so rare to hear such sentiments expressed. But insofar as they deal with taking sides, so to speak, in the situation in Cuba, I disagree with the entire [...] strongly and most regretfully [...] but I'm not persuaded.

The parallel, first of all-- to take the questions in order; and I hope I don't repeat myself too much, please be patient [...]

The U.S. aided in the overturn of the Guatemalan government, and isn't there a parallel between what happened there several years ago and what is happening now? Yes, there is a parallel, of course. But that's not what's decisive in the two cases. The difference--that for me turns the scale in making up my mind. Naturally the U.S. didn't want the Guatemalan regime of that time (of Arbenz, if I remember correctly); it doesn't want the Castro regime in Cuba, obviously; and in that respect there is an exact parallel. Obviously the U.S. gave every aid that it thought was needed in the overturn of the Guatemalan regime and it's doing that in Cuba, of course. I don't mean the U.S. is neutral. I thought I indicated in my speech that they were aiding this movement, supporting this movement, financing this movement, and arming this movement. I may now add that it has been training this movement, in training fields that it has in the U.S. at its disposal, in Louisiana, Florida, god knows where else, and training fields that its vassal in Guatemala has at its disposal. No problem there.

But there's a difference. In Guatemala, so far as I know--friends may have a more detailed and exact knowledge on it, but so far as I know or as I know or as I recall at the time from reading of the events, the only forces that were at the disposal of the U.S. were arch-reactionary militarists, colonels, officers and the like; that was all, as far as I know. In Cuba there is a popular force opposed to Castro. I don't know of any trade-unionists, of any workers, of any middle-class elements, of any democrats, of any equivalent of the July 26th'ers, that was opposed to the regime in Guatemala. I know them in the Cuban case, those that are in the U.S. and those that are in Cuba. A popular, democratic movement. It's not a socialist movement--some socialists in it, but not a socialist movement. It is a democratic popular movement; that's a big difference. I have supported or sympathized with such movements in the past, my sympathy was objected to in the past, but never objected to by comrades or friends whom I heard here this evening in connection with Cuba.

* A transcription of the discussion from the floor could not be included within the compass of this pamphlet. This is rather unfair to those who took part, since not all of them would agree that the summary reply by itself can give the reader an adequate idea of what was said, and also since some of the points taken up in the summary had not been presented in this discussion period at all. In reading the summary speech which follows, therefore, no back-assumptions should be made on exactly what had been said from the floor. -- H.D.

No; Cuba may be different from the situations in other countries where I took a similar position--years ago, not just last night--but I don't see it basically, UNLESS you believe that the Cuban government, the Castro government, is a socialist government--I don't believe that, never believed it, I don't believe it now--and against this socialist government come backward, conservative, reactionary workers taking arms. That can happen; not every worker is a socialist, and even [when] a socialist government is established, you can find many reactionary workers against socialism who can be incited to try to overturn it. Since I don't believe it was a socialist government but a totalitarian--excuse me, an authoritarian middle-class government, which is increasingly in the hands of an anti-socialist totalitarian force, the Communists, I can't have that same feeling.

Now, did the CIA finance, or help to finance, this Revolutionary Council movement? I have no doubt; I have no evidence, but I have no doubt. I have no doubt; no one needs to convince me of that, I'm sure of that. By the State Department and the Kennedy government, no doubt. Did they give them arms? I have no doubt of that, none at all. That by itself does not determine my position, not at all. I'm a socialist, and I'm a political person. I try as much as possible--it isn't always easy--to live in the present world, in order that I can get OUT of it. I cannot get out of it unless I live IN it. And as I cannot get out of the misery and wretchedness and difficulties and complexities of present-day social existence unless I take part in this present existence. And more than once, revolutionaries have gladly taken arms from capitalist governments, from reactionary capitalist governments, from imperialist capitalist governments, to carry out their revolution; and most revolutionists, most socialists, most democrats applauded that, under certain circumstances. All we have to examine, in my view, is not "Where did you get your arms?"

As one comrade already brought out, the Irish revolutionists unhesitatingly took arms from the Kaiser's government in 1916, used the Kaiser's U-boats, submarines, to travel to Ireland, trained their troops outside of Ireland, got their arms outside of Ireland, since the British who occupied Ireland refused to give arms to the Irish revolutionists. They made their uprising with invading forces, I know, of course; but there were very few people friendly to the revolutionary movement who opposed them because of the source of their arms or even their money.

The CIA, the American government, has its AIMS in Cuba--absolutely, of course; more or less the aims that it had in Guatemala. Now I happen to think--I may be wrong on this, I'm not insisting on it--I happen to think that its main aim is NOT the restoration of the sugar companies, of the plantations to the American sugar companies. I'm sure it wouldn't object if that were so, but I don't think that's the main aim. That's my opinion. Its main aim is to eliminate the possibility of a Russian political base right next to the U.S. Just as the Russians would like to eliminate American bases, military or political, that are close to their borders. That's understandable. That's not my primary interest, I assure you.

But I cannot be convinced, as yet, that the main aims of the Revolutionary Council people, or--except for some Batistaists who snuck in a little--the elements behind Cardona, are the same. I don't believe it. I don't see any evidence for that. I

don't believe that they're just tools or mercenaries of the U.S.; I don't believe it; I haven't seen any evidence of it. If you have, I'm ready to listen to it. If you say that's what's in complete control of this movement, all right, that'll change my opinion; I'm easy to convince, as a matter of fact.

These people are not Marxists, this Revolutionary Council; they're not socialists, as I've indicated; not people that have my principles, or, if you don't think I have any left, YOUR principles; just ordinary democrats, conservative democrats, radicals, or what we call in our special private jargon: bourgeois democrats, not totalitarian, and militant trade-unionists; no angels there. Their aim is not to restore capitalism because they're anti-socialist, and their aim is not to establish the rule of the U.S. in Cuba. I don't believe it. Batista's might be. But I haven't seen any evidence of the past or present policies or conduct of this movement that would confirm it.

Now let us deal with the question of whether the arms that have been used in Cuba, being U.S. arms or having used U.S. bases, isn't the same thing as U.S. intervention. I don't think that that's so simple or that it can be equated with [intervention]. I think that if we had time and you patience I could give ample examples that that is not necessarily the case. That's not what I consider armed intervention by the U.S. Armed intervention by the U.S.--and I mean ARMED intervention--means a force that is not Cuban in any way, which is purely mercenary, which reaches the most extreme and obvious form so that even the biggest dunderhead in the world can see it if it sends the U.S. Marines there, let us say. And that I'm absolutely opposed to, completely opposed to, and irreconcilably opposed to. And if that's what this invasion degenerates into, it will add one more tragedy to the Cuban people; and I'll be absolutely opposed to it. I don't see that as the case now. It's a simple thing to say, and it appeals very readily to quick thinking--and people want to think quickly, and that's understandable: the thing is happening now and they want to do something. All right, but I can't think that quickly or that easily.

Now, isn't the invasion a "crossroads" for Latin America? If Castro wins, revolutions will occur everywhere in Latin America; if he loses, black reaction will follow all over in Latin America: Not necessarily; I don't think so.

If Castro wins, MORE than one thing may happen. If he wins and succeeds, as I've tried to indicate, in convincing everybody or enough people in Cuba that the invasion is a pure-and-simple American [...], it is entirely possible--I would even say--good, I'll leave it at possible--it's entirely possible that the tendency in Cuba for the Communist Party to take over in effect if not in name--in effect, in complete effect--the regime in Cuba would be enormously accelerated. That may satisfy people in the U.S., some people; I'm sure it wouldn't satisfy many people in this hall.

Why would it be accelerated? From my knowledge --I think I have some knowledge--of similar things in other countries, it is precisely in this kind of a situation that the C.P., which has its organized, disciplined cadre, with thousands upon thousands of people, more or less trained, politically better trained than any other political organization or group in Cuba, would naturally tend to, and would be anxious to organize for and plan for, to dominate every single strategical position, above all the mi-

litary positions, and to use the situation that's created now to dominate every other social position more and more exclusively. That is how it operates. That's no great secret.

People have seen that at least--in detail at least since 1936 in the Spanish Civil War. In Cuba that trend and that possibility is MORE accentuated and more easy to realize than it was in Spain. Why? Because in Spain the C.P., even though it was backed by Russia, still had to contend with massive political popular organizations which had apparatuses, men, training, and which even had forces far greater than the C.P. had originally or even toward the end. They had a mountainous anarchist movement, not the kind you read about in sweet books, but disciplined, tight, tough, armed, trained. They had a socialist movement, and with trade unions at its base--a socialist movement, the [rest of the] trade unions at its base--armed, more disciplined, tough. There was the small POUM movement, the Workers Party of Marxian Unification, also armed, organized, trained, smart, shrewd, intelligent, and knowledgeable about Stalinism, with its own militias and its own sections in the army. And there nevertheless the C.P. pushed constantly, and with its agents, including its police agents, to occupy one after another of the strategic positions in Cuba--er, in Spain; and they slit the throat of the Spanish Revolution and the Spanish Republic. This is the problem, I think, and I say in Cuba it is easier.

What other organizations are there now? The Castroites have no organization. They have popular support in one or another sense, I don't know. Is there a socialist movement there, is there a trade-union movement there? Is there an anarchist movement there? The anarchist movement in Cuba has been absolutely destroyed. A few of their leaders are now in New York where they escaped with their lives--people who suffered bitterly under Batista, who fought him bitterly--the anarchists. I'm not an anarchist; I'm not pro-anarchist; these are absolutely respectable comrades of mine; I respect them, they have my respect, they're fighters: they're anti-Castro. And they report that the Communists have taken over more and more, here, there and the other, in their devilishly quiet and efficient way. I have nothing against them; that's their job and they are doing it. I can't complain if they are doing their job. All I've got to do is do mine. And I say in this critical situation I can just picture in my mind's eye--it's not too hard--what the atmosphere must be in Cuba: a trained, disciplined force which has no other to contest with, instantly and immediately and rapidly occupies the important positions, military, political, cultural, trade-union, everything you want. That does not inspire me with enthusiasm.

So if Castro wins, let us say, who will win? Now if you can guarantee it, all right, then I'll modify my whole view. But I don't think you can guarantee it. There is a possibility--I repeat, a possibility--that if Castro wins--He may; this revolution may turn out to be the flop of the decade, the invasion; I don't know; I don't know what the actual relation of forces is; I don't know; if you know, you're a smarter man than I am. If Castro wins, it may be the victory, the definitive victory, or lead directly to the definitive victory in Cuba of the Communist Party. I'm not forthat victory. I may be hanged for that--I mean politically, I don't mean figuratively [sic]--that is, people may not agree with me; that's how I am.

If he loses, if Castro loses, and this Revolutionary Council group came to power, that means black reaction all over America: I don't believe that; I don't believe that. That MAY be the trend if the elements in the Revolutionary Council develop the war, or permit the development, or stand in the way of the development of, at a subsequent stage, not the [...]--that I think is excluded if they win, because there'll be an enormous loosening up, naturally, of the extreme Batista people. Then, of course, black reaction will tend to spread in Latin America; that is an enormous risk and I'm not at all oblivious to it, nor do I consider it a trifle. It ain't.

A contrary development is quite possible, unless we conclude that the only revolutions that are possible in the Latin American countries are, at the best, authoritarian bourgeois revolutions or somewhat totalitarian revolutions, and that a democratic bourgeois revolution or middle-class revolution is excluded. An authoritarian bourgeois revolution, or --excuse me, I forgot--a Batista-type revolution, a Batista regime, one of the two; but that a middle-class democratic revolution is absolutely excluded: I don't think so, and that's why I differ with some comrades. I think a bourgeois democratic revolution --more or less democratic revolution--in some of the Latin American countries is possible. If it is not, I would have to say: I can do nothing and you can do nothing, and the Latin American people can do nothing, because there isn't a hell of a lot of choice between a Batista-type revolution and a Communist Party despotism, not a hell of a lot -- one is a little more [...], the other is a little less [...]--not a hell of a lot. If there is however a choice, I want to orient myself to what constitutes the most likely, most preferable basis for what I would choose. I'd choose socialism, and I do; that's my ideal, and I haven't changed from that ideal. But I'd take a bourgeois democratic revolution as my preference in Latin America because under it I can develop more or less freely a labor movement, a socialist movement. But under the Stalinists, as under the Batistaites, I cannot develop or even think of developing a labor movement or a socialist movement. Now if there is a Stalinist country where that was possible, where that has proved possible, I would like to hear the name of it.

[Here follows a passage replying to a gentleman who had demanded to know if Shachtman was for the Cuban workers or for U.S. big business. Then Shachtman replies to another critic:]

... He's sorry to see a socialist, and particularly an American socialist, and one he knows, attack the Castro regime on the very eve or in the very midst of an attack from the U.S. [...] I'm conscious of the fact that while I'm a socialist, I'm a U.S. socialist, and I'm speaking of a regime, namely that of Castro, of a country that is trying to rise out of imposed backwardness--backwardness imposed by the heads of my country, and I have an obligation to speak with the greatest possible restraint. [...]

My attack was not directed essentially at Castro but at the U.S. and its policy. My criticism was not directed at the July 26 Movement or at the movement which I called Castro the hero and leader of, for which I think he'll be primarily favorably remembered, but, not to be harsh, I think I made it clear that in my opinion, strongly held, I do not believe that Castro is a Communist or a tool of the Communists or anything like that; I think he's an idealist; that I supported the revolution, [the old

group], the July 26 revolution; that Castro and the revolution achieved great things for the Cuban people in an impossibly short period of time, [... ...] which I covered by that phrase. I'm against that revolution being throttled, and throttled inevitably by a Communist Party regime. [Heckler: "Then you're in favor of supporting the invasion, aren't you?"] I listened patiently while I was being differed with...

Now, Castro got a "plebiscite," it was pointed out, because he was there. The invaders, however, were trained here and armed here, financed here. Yes, of course, there's a difference. Before the Castro invaders invaded, they trained outside the country. Batista didn't permit them to train in the country. The present invaders-- The U.S. government didn't finance Castro; that's a big difference, no question about it. They weren't interested in overturning the Batista government; I told you what I think they are interested in, primarily. The invaders were trained here, and took advantage of the interest of the U.S. in their invasion. I repeat that I don't think that they're in personal [...] of the U.S. or that they intend merely to carry out the orders of the U.S. They were armed here because I don't know of anywhere else they could get arms; I doubt if they know anywhere else they could get arms. I discussed it, I must say jokingly--not that I consider it funny--discussed it with some of the trade-union people involved, and they could only get arms in the U.S. and not in Paraguay or [Ghana], not in Costa Rica or really anywhere else. To hold them off, to hold the Americans off, Castro obtained arms too, didn't he? Those arms are Russian; they're not manufactured in a Cuban factory so far as I know: Czechoslovakian arms, or Chinese arms, Polish arms, Albanian arms. I don't find anything wrong with that. In a revolution the tendency is to take arms where they are, not to take arms where they are not.

Secondly, the invaders, in my information-- I can only go by information that I consider, insofar as I am able to check up on them, as sound-- the invaders were supplemented by anti-Castroites on the island, who have been fighting there for some time, who have been fighting there for some time. Castro fought there for some time, with 200 men, that's all, 200 men, no more and sometimes less--and sometimes less. He didn't have the masses of the people grab arms and come to his side from the beginning, not at all [...] I could easily have said at that time, Where are the Cubans who support him?

Now, how important are the trade unions in the coalition? Why, I remember something else out of my checkered past. I had no objection, nor did my friends, during the war, the Second World War, which many people said was an imperialist war on both sides, the Allies' side and the other side: we won't support any side in the war; but when the Resistance movement started, in France or other places, we not only had no objections to their taking arms from the imperialists, we advised them to take arms from the imperialists, for the Resistance movement. It wasn't a socialist movement, at least by our standards, politically confused, a little bit unpleasant elements, so to speak, and so on; but we said, Go ahead, get arms where you can. That's the best place to get them because, I repeat, you cannot get arms where there aren't any.

And when there was a disturbance, so to speak, in Poland, I didn't hesitate to support Mikolajczyk in Poland. He wasn't a socialist; he may have wanted restoration. I thought the forces, the social

forces who could not themselves articulate anything--but there was the beginning of a totalitarian regime in Poland [... ...] and I was never a Mikolajczyk man, and I am not now, and I wasn't then and I was not before. I'm a socialist; I was then, I am now. I didn't choose this world; I'd have chosen a different one, but in order to fight it I have to live in this one.

How important ARE the trade-unionists in this coalition? I don't know, but then again no one else knows. Yet, no one else CAN know. We can only find that out in the development of the fight in Cuba. How important are the July 26 dissidents who are in this coalition? I don't know; you don't know. I can also ask, How important is Cardona in this whole business? Because he has the blessing of the State Department? You can't buy much beer with that in Cuba. And IF and when the coalition triumphs--I don't know if it will; I don't know; not the point--but if and when it triumphs, what happens instantly, precisely because it's a coalition, essentially it's a military front? [The individual forces in it will go separately]; and when [they go separately] I might take a chance and bet a nickel that the trade-union elements, or those people whom it represents, will have more inherent power in Cuba than, say, Cardona and the social forces that he represents in Cuba. That I'm willing to bet on.

As for which one will win over the other, I don't know. I'm not the seventh son of a seventh son, and I haven't any crystal ball. I don't know. But I'm inclined to put my stakes on the trade unions and on those intellectuals and middle-class elements, professionals, democratic bourgeois professionals who were (so to speak) represented to one extent or another by the dissident July 26 elements who are in this coalition. As for the elements represented--social elements represented by Cardona, how much they weigh I don't know, but I don't think I need a very big scale to weigh them in Cuba. So while I can't guarantee anything, I'm not certain by any means, I don't think it's quite so at all that if Cardona and the coalition of elements he represents [wins] that we are doomed to--what? to restorationism? Now if we're doomed to restorationism there, and if the coalition wins, the door is open to Batistaism, Batista restorationism, then I might just as simply indicate [that], and I think what is more present fact--not just projection--more present facts are: that if Batista wins, not only the door but all the windows and plenty of chinks in the walls are open to the triumph of the Stalinists. Now that makes my choice very difficult; it doesn't make my choice easy and clearly indicated. I know where sentiment is, because I feel that sentiment myself, consequently I can easily understand it in others; but I want, in addition to sentiment, something more substantial.

Now does a country--the question was raised--have the right to its own Stalinist regime if it wants one? Not that we're for it, but does a country have a right? or does someone from another country have the right to wipe out that Stalinist regime? I think a country has the right to that misery, absolutely. And I wouldn't assign to the U.S. the role of cleaner-up of all countries by force of arms; absolutely not. First I want to know if those arms are clean; if they're clean, all right, I'd look at it a little differently. I don't think they are clean enough, I am sorry to say. I wouldn't assign to the U.S. the imposition of an anti-Stalinist regime, just as I do not assign to Russia the right

to impose a Stalinist regime in another country that has a capitalist regime.

But I don't see that in the present case. Cuba did not choose the Stalinist regime. If it could be shown that the Cuban revolution by Castro was made in the name: 'we want a regime which will do the following things,' namely, the things that were done finally, and the sympathy of the people clearly expressed--not necessarily by elections in this case but clearly expressed by clear popular support--all right, I'd regret it deeply, they will regret it tomorrow--they have chosen the Stalinist regime: keep your hands off them.

But I don't know when the Cuban people chose the Stalinist regime; I don't know when they chose cooperation with the Communist Party--even cooperation with the Communist Party. When did they choose that? In the announcement that Castro made when he called on the people to support the July 26 Movement--'bring us to power, take us to Havana, drive out Batista'? He never said that, never. So they didn't choose it, as far as I can see. So many were opposed to the possibility even of a Stalinist regime that they defected--all kinds of defections, from all kinds of organizations and groups. Defector is not Batistaist. Batistaists did not defect from the Castro revolution; they were smashed by the Castro revolution. I am talking about defectors who were supporters of the Castro regime. They wanted an overturn, and they have extraordinary difficulties and complexities. I am not their creator, nor am I the creator of the Castro regime; it's a very difficult matter.

Now two last words. The first is that I understand absolutely the reaction that has been taken to the Castro regime, and I might be wrong; it wouldn't be the first time, you know. I am not one of those lucky few whose analyses has always been correct; whose political positions have always been correct; I may be wrong. But I fear this: the taking over, quickly or slowly, of Cuba by the C.P. As they say, if you don't have eyes to see with, you won't have eyes to cry with either. I don't want that to happen. Nor do I say that it's absolutely going to hap-

pen, but I can demand of every friend, not to agree with me in that apprehension, but that he consider that possibility.

Think about it. If you feel that it is just a hophead dream, or if it's just something in the Hearst press I repeat--Many things in the Hearst press I repeat; all my life I have done that. Not everything; if they said Hitler was a monster I repeated that. Many things in the Communist press that I repeat: America is an imperialist country, I repeat that. [More on the point on repeating things from the Hearst press.....]

The other thing is: I know how hard it is for a socialist who takes his politics seriously to face a conflict of such importance, such exciting and demanding importance, and be forced to feel: how can I be neutral in a fight like this? The American government, the American capitalist class, the American imperialists, and all the rest of them, are attacking Cuba; I have got to take sides. I understand that; I even sympathize with it. But I don't follow it necessarily.

There have unfortunately in our times been more than one situation where a socialist, with tears in his heart--I don't want to sound sentimental--unhappy, grinding his teeth, when there was a fight on, and it was a big fight, could not take a position for one side or the other. That was the case with me and many of my friends in the past in the fight between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists, in China. How could we take a position for either side? I couldn't. I was called upon to. I wanted to, because I like to fight and I like to take sides. But I couldn't. That's the wretched world we live in.

Once again also we are encountering a very complicated situation. My answer to it is not full--(a)--and to the extent that it tries to be an answer it is not categorical and absolute and I'm not fighting tooth and nail to impose it on you. But I doubt the wisdom of some of the answers that I have heard this evening--very easy, simple, in a situation that won't allow either for a very easy or simple answer.

MORE CLIPPINGS.....

U.S. News & World Report,
May 15, 1961

It never was much of a secret that anti-Castro Cubans were being armed and trained by the U. S. military services, here and abroad. How

U. S. destroyers escorted the ships to within six miles of shore. A U. S. aircraft carrier was in escort, as well, but remained about 30 miles offshore.

The B-26s of the anti-Castro forces flew from bases 600 miles away. They were escorted by U. S. Navy jets which peeled off about five miles from the beach, and left the B-26s on their own.

There had been plenty of American participation in the preinvasion camps in Guatemala, and in the smaller camps in Louisiana and Florida. Cuban paratroopers were trained in Panama and Guatemala. Cuban sailors were trained in landing operations at Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. About 30 U. S. Army instructors helped in Guatemala.

It is at this point that Cuban bitterness enters. Leaders of the invasion say they had been promised air support by U. S. jets. Th-

What went wrong? The Cubans say they were convinced that they would have carrier air cover, "otherwise we would not have been there."

Another point of bitterness among the Cubans is this: Some of their leaders say that they had been promised by the Central Intelligence Agency that--once they were established on the beaches--there would be support for them by a three-nation force of 30,000 men. On rechecking with the Americans, they say, the figure was reduced to 15,000--but that still seemed substantial.

It was doomed, according to anti-Castro men, when the U. S. air support they expected to cover their landings failed to materialize. Without air cover, it was impossible for the Cubans to cling to their beach long enough to put a provisional government ashore that could call for U. S. recognition--and open aid.

SPEAKING OF GUATEMALA.... Latest evidence of U. S. intervention in the overthrow of the Guatemalan government of Arbenz came during the 1960 election campaign in a frank dispatch by James Reston to the N.Y. Times (Oct. 25, 1960). Reston referred to Kennedy's position--"Senator Kennedy's call for Government and Allied aid to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba"--but then went on to point out that--

Nixon's solution of the Cuban problem creates little more enthusiasm in the embassies of our friends. His suggestion is that the U. S. "quarantine" Castro by refusing to sell him goods, and that we do in Cuba "what we did with Guatemala."

"We quarantined Arbenz," the Vice President said on Friday night in the fourth campaign TV debate. "The result was that the Guatemalan people themselves eventually rose up and threw him out."

This is the joke of the week end in the Latin Ameri-

can Embassies. For every official who knows anything about the fall of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman's government in Guatemala in 1954 knows that the U. S. Government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, worked actively with, and financed, and made available the arms with which the anti-Arbenz forces finally "threw him out."

In fact, the Eisenhower Administration, and Nixon personally, have taken credit in public for getting rid of Arbenz.

HAL DRAPER

Max Shachtman's speech in Berkeley on April 18, in which he came out for the victory of the counter-revolutionary invasion of Cuba, makes a valuable document for discussion and study.

Its center of interest is not merely the Cuban question, important as that is especially at this writing when the U.S. may be moving toward some form of more direct intervention. Its center of interest, from a longer-term point of view, is the methodology of its argumentation in favor of what was, in fact, predominantly an operation of American imperialism.

In a world where the danger of the Big War, the war between the two rival camps of imperialist powers, looms, the approach to the Cuban events given by Shachtman is a preview, or small working model, of one kind of line which socialists will meet when the pressure is on to reconcile them to support of the Western camp.

This, of course, is no problem for those who have already decided in their own minds that that is where they stand. The problem exists for those socialists, never plentiful and today somewhat reduced, who maintain their political opposition to both war camps and refuse to support American imperialism out of a justified hatred of Stalinist totalitarianism, as they refuse to whitewash Stalinist imperialism out of inveterate hatred for capitalism. These are the "Third Camp socialists." Shachtman's speech invites examination from that standpoint.

This Third Camp socialist tendency is, on the whole, resolutely and principledly hostile to any "softness on Stalinism." This is not an easy stance to maintain in the American political climate, where the high-pitched atmosphere of anti-Communist agitation from all sides tends to push in either one of two directions: either you get The Shakes in horrified reaction to the dangers of Kremlin domination and embrace the protection of Washington and the NATO alliance (the vast majority, of course); or you react against the official din with theories about the progressiveness or peaceableness of the Russian despots, illusions of their imminent democratization, or other forms of sympathy for the rival camp in the world struggle. We are here interested, of course, in the pressure from the first side, resulting in the malady referred to as the Shakes. It is also sometimes known by the ungainly name of "Stalinophobia."

This term does not derogate legitimate and justified fear of the real horrors of Stalinist domination and terror. I share those fears as much as any friend or ex-friend of mine who has been stampeded by these fears into announcing "I choose the West." If a man finds himself apparently trapped between a raging fire on the one side and a collapsing stairway on the other, he does not prove that he is more sensitive to danger than you are if he hurls himself out of the nearest window. It would be advisable to keep your head and look for a third way out.

The distinctive characteristic of the Shakes is not its anti-Stalinism or anti-Communism; in this respect, personally, I yield to no one. The distinctive characteristic of the Shakes as a political

malady is that it tends to SUBORDINATE to anti-Communism ALL OTHER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Obviously this political disease is to Third Camp socialism what the boll weevil is to cotton. In the field of civil liberties it induces well-intentioned people who want to be democrats to countenance witchhunt assaults on the rights of Communists and others, as they make their choice (as they see it) between anti-Communism and civil-libertarianism.

When a man is the victim of the Shakes, it is the dangers (including the real dangers) of Stalinism which are alone in focus before his eyes. Everything else, to one extent or another, blurs out in the background, and this is the picture of the world which becomes the only real one for him.

To continue the political-malady metaphor: Shachtman's speech should be regarded as a live-virus vaccine. Delivered on the second day of the invasion itself, before much if any information had come out, it had an appreciable impact on many among its hearers. Then in the next couple of days the gory details of the CIA control of the invasion came out. This sort of thing can be an invaluable experience. In a way it was as if the 1914 socialists who had been swept away by the social-patriotic mood were immediately presented with the secret treaties ... This is an obviously exaggerated comparison but perhaps it is suggestive.

In any case, the following comments are made with this therapeutic value in mind, and not as a rounded discussion of the Cuban invasion itself, which would require a good deal more space.

I

First of all, what was the position which Shachtman presented in this speech?

There are passages in which he seems to be talking about a "neutral" position or "not taking sides," as he does near the end of his summary speech. This may be his recommendation to those who want to oppose the invasion, as the context may show; but whatever the point of this kind of talk, he left no possible question about his stand in three carefully formulated passages on the subject at the end of his presentation.

"My sympathies--I don't even want to begin to conceal my sympathies--are primarily with" (he explained) two out of the three tendencies described as constituting the invaders' forces. We need hardly stress that in Shachtman's language such a declaration of "sympathy" is a political statement, not a sentimental one.

He then added "My hopes for their success--and I hope for their success" (enunciating the last six words deliberately)--balanced by "fears" of right-wing influence. Finally, he trusted that the elements with whom he sympathized would be effective in breaking the back of the Castro tyranny as they had been effective in breaking the Batista regime. Spoken as his friends, or friends of his friends, were fighting on the beach of the Bay of Pigs, there was little possibility of misunderstanding.

II

Was this the trouble: that Shachtman unfortunately did not know what later came out about the CIA domination and sponsorship of the counter-revolutionary council and its invasion? One should like to think so; and of course only Shachtman can say whether, on the basis of what we all know now, he wishes to repudiate his Berkeley line. It would be an honorable thing to do. But there are at least two difficulties in the way of such a supposition:

(1) After all, as the N.Y. Times and other sources kept emphasizing as they recounted the story, the main outlines of the situation had been an "open secret" on an amazingly big scale even before the invasion.

It is true that the failure of the operation brought an outpouring of circumstantial details, such as the locking up of the Cardona council by the CIA, but obviously these fantastic corroborations of the general state of affairs are only frosting on the cake. They underline only the exceptional crudeness, openness and therefore transparency of the domination which the overlords exercised over their vassals in this whole affair. The N.Y. Times, Time magazine, the Sat. Eve. Post, Wall Street Journal, Nation, and other sources had already revealed much; so much, that at the Berkeley meeting where Shachtman spoke a number of people who took the floor to dissociate themselves from him already stated quite confidently that the invasion was controlled, dominated, planned, financed, and mounted by the CIA.

If Shachtman was more in the dark on this matter, it is a cause for wonder.

(2) But as a matter of fact Shachtman's speech is peppered with references to special sources of inside information on and personal contact with knowledgeable supporters of the counter-revolutionary council.

He has gotten his information, he says, "from informed people, and not from superficial or trivial journalistic articles." He has checked on the credentials of his Cuban informants, he knows all about them. He discussed with them such problems as how to get arms, an indication perhaps of sufficient intimacy to warrant also discussing such other matters as were indeed an "open secret" elsewhere, i.e., not a secret at all. It would be distressing to find that, after all that, Shachtman had been "taken in" by his friends of the invasion council, on whom he put his personal cachet.

The alternative is to accept that he knew at least as much as had already been printed in the press, if not a good deal more, about the CIA domination of the operation, and that this character of the affair did not deter him, as the invaders were striking, from advocating socialist support to the enterprise.

As with more important people in Washington, the trouble would not seem to be a "failure in Intelligence work" (information) but a failure in politics.

III

Is everything in Shachtman's speech wrong or untrue? Just the contrary. It is juster to consider it a virtuoso performance in taking indubitable political propositions and truths and weaving them into a tissue that might hold water, as an apologia for the invasion. Otherwise, of course, it could have

had no impact at all under the circumstances.

There is nothing wrong with that method in itself. You and I do it all the time when we try to draw conclusions on new problems from an examination of old ones. The sidewalk barker also does it when he seeks to get your head nodding in agreement with him on something, like the sinfulness of sin, and then pulls out the snake-oil while your head is still bobbing.

Thus, to the lengthy and copious denunciations of Stalinism which featured Shachtman's long address (the lengthiest of all was a good percentage of the presentation and is not reprinted here), we must say amen. After an hour or so of such agitation, he had quite convinced his listeners that they should NOT favor Communist Party control of Cuba. When in his summary he came out again foursquare against the victory of the C.P. in Cuba, and added, "I may be hanged for that....politically....people may not agree with me; that's how I am," we looked around the hall to spot the miscreants who would hang him for this virtuous sentiment but they were hidden.

His description of the operation of the C.P. in the Spanish war, and application to the aims and opportunities of the C.P. in Cuba, was more serious educationally. The same was true to earlier sections of his presentation not reprinted here.

So the problem is not whether this or that point woven in by Shachtman is valid in itself, but whether it justified support of this invasion. This is not at all the same thing.

In the Korean war, it would have been easy (let us say) to denounce the North Korean attack and Stalinist crimes in the land, using nothing but solid and unanswerable charges, but whether this added up to support of the U.S.-South Korean side was quite another matter. Even if one added that one's sympathies were with the left wing of the pro-war camp.

If and when the Big War comes, there will doubtless be plenty of room for this mode of recruitment to support of the war: we will be agitated not with lies but with the real crimes and dangers of the Stalinist enemy, or rather with the latter as well as the former, provided the government does not lack propagandists sophisticated enough to know how this is done. If the Big War had been ready to break out in 1956 and had been triggered off by the Hungarian Revolution--say, with intervention by Washington presumably to back the Hungarians--we can all imagine clearly, with a shudder, how easy the speeches would have flowed along these lines, and what an impact they would have had...

The point here is simply this: Denunciations of the crimes and dangers of Stalinist control are fine in themselves, and I'm in favor of lots of it; but when they get pointed toward justification of operations of American imperialism against this enemy-of-our-enemy, then it is a good idea to take a closer look before getting carried away.

Unless, of course, you have already come to the conscientious conclusion that the only realistic hope in this wretched world of stopping the advance of Communist power is to "choose the West," with whatever radical reservations.

IV

Now let us look at the method of debaters' mechanism, by which Shachtman works up his argument

in support of an invasion which is "planned, coordinated and directed" by the CIA (as the N.Y. Times put it). We should get well acquainted with it.

---What's your objections to it (he asks in effect)? Do you object because they took arms from the U.S.? But so did the Resistance take arms from the imperialists, and you advised them to. Do you object because they used U.S. ships to invade? But the "Irish revolutionists" landed from German submarines (he claims). Do you object because they took advantage of U.S. interests to train outside of Cuba? But so did Castro's men train outside of Cuba; and then there are the same "Irish revolutionists," etc. Do you object because there are reactionary elements, unpleasant elements, in the coalition? So how about Mikolajczyk...etc., etc.

The pattern is to fish out a "historical precedent" for any single aspect of the CIA operation, taken separately.

It is the question of "taking arms" that he works over, particularly, and keeps returning to. This is so because he feels the firmest ground here. The question of "taking arms" has a long history in the record of revolutions and class struggles.

On this score Shachtman recalls something "out of my checkered past. I had no objection, nor did my friends, during the war...when the Resistance movement started...to their taking arms from the imperialists, for the Resistance movement. It wasn't a socialist movement, at least by our standards, politically confused, a little bit unpleasant elements so to speak, and so on; but we said, Go ahead, get arms where you can."

Shachtman is here recalling the position of the Independent Socialist League (see the New International for Feb. 1943). If I pursue this recollection a little more, it is to show that the political question involved was a little more complex and difficult than is remembered by the Shachtman of today, who is volubly against "easy answers."

For the ISL, the problem of the relationship between the Resistance movement and the imperialists was a political question of which the question of "taking arms" was only one facet. For the ISL the meaning of "taking arms" from the imperialists depended in any given case precisely on the relationship between the movement and the imperialists, not the other way round. Of course, "taking arms" (or money, etc.) is not good or bad in itself; this is ABC. The decisive question to be examined is the real independence of the movement from the imperialists in this relationship.

A movement which is independent -- which means uncontrolled, undominated, free to act in accordance with its own decisions, not a creature of the other's power -- can think in terms of utilizing antagonisms among others, and come to a practical arrangement, freely, on one thing or another with any one of them. In such a context, "taking arms" is a practical arrangement, not a political relationship.

The ISL resolution which Shachtman appeals to repeatedly stressed the fundamental premise of the independence of the movement from the imperialists. Here are some samples:

"The imperialists seek to convert these movements into obedient, disciplined auxiliaries to the Anglo-American armed forces. The achievement of this aim would mean the corruption of the movement, in as much as it would be deprived of any independence of the program or movement,

would cease to be a popular democratic movement, and become a mere instrument of the imperialist powers. Not only that, but it would cease to be a movement for genuine national freedom..."

Could anything have been stated more clearly? The ISL based its position on the view that, by and large, the Resistance movements in practice were independent of and not under the control of, say, De Gaulle or his emissaries at this time. This was our answer to those misguided French friends who refused to have anything to do with the Resistance forces on the ground that they were only appendages to one side in the imperialist war. I think we were right, but that's beside the point. The point is that we believed this independence to be a fact in 1942, and took our position in this belief. This was the crux which would have had to be refuted before we changed our mind.

But, we warned, the imperialists wanted to control and dominate this movement, as everybody knew. If they succeeded, we warned, this movement would cease to be what it is now. It would cease to be a "popular democratic movement"; it would become an "instrument" of one of the sides in the war; it would no longer be "a movement for genuine national freedom."

That which the imperialists would have liked to make of the Resistance movement in 1942, and which we specifically warned against, was precisely that which characterized the Cardona coalition council from its beginning: this was the "open secret" of 1961.

Where the imperialists in 1942 were trying to throw a lasso over the Resistance forces, it was the CIA which had scotch-taped the Cardona council together in the first place.

Where the imperialists in 1942 were trying to get the Resistance groups to listen to directives taken to them by emissaries, the Cardona council members were not even allowed to watch "their" own men being trained by the U.S.'s operatives.

Where the 1942 imperialists sought to "corrupt" the Resistance groups, the CIA did not have to corrupt the Cardona council: that council and the invasion was its creation, its creature, from beginning to end.

Consider the enormity of the difference between these two cases--the light-years between, politically speaking--where Shachtman now sees only the fact that both "took arms." What the ISL resolution was about was not the detail about taking arms but the analysis of the independence of the movement as a sine qua non of its progressive significance.

V

In another place, the ISL resolution refers to Mikhailovich's Resistance groups in Yugoslavia, as an example of the bad kind of development:

"How disastrous the domination of the popular movement of resistance by the imperialists can be, is beginning to be illustrated by the consolidation of the control of the Serbian reactionaries, represented by Mikhailovich, over the fighting forces who simply wanted an end to German tyranny and not the restoration of Greater Serbian national oppression of other people."

This is given as an example of a Resistance movement that had been taken over by imperialist reaction, in our then opinion. This is discussed again

later in the resolution as one of many examples of the great complexity of the situation. (Shachtman's complaint that the revolutionary socialist goes in for easy, simple formulas is a recent discovery on his part, though not unknown previously.)

The point about the nature of the Mikhailovich movement is made again, and the resolution adds: "It is not accidental that this movement [rather than the Partisans] is given official aid and recognition by Anglo-American imperialism." Note that here the Mikhailovich movement is not deemed reactionary because it took arms from the Anglo-American imperialists; the relation is viewed just the other way round--the comment on the Anglo-American arms policy in Yugoslavia is made after the political character of the Mikhailovich movement has been judged on other grounds, rightly or wrongly.

Now does this mean there were no good, honest, progressive, revolutionary elements in the Mikhailovich camp? To ask is to answer. Suppose a Comrade S. came along and told us: "I have just had lunch with a brace of stout working-class fighters in the Mikhailovich movement, genuine Yugoslav nationalists everyone of them, with records you can check on--I saw them with my own eyes, and I give you my personal assurance..."

You would have to reply: "These stout working-class fighters, who must be all you say they are because I have unquestioning confidence in your political judgement--are they in control of this movement, do they or their friends and similars lead it, do they or the likes of them decisively determine its political character? or are they its captives, its window-dressing, do they themselves suffer from lamentable illusions about this movement they're in, like so many other good people elsewhere? This we will have to decide for ourselves on the basis of everything we know about this movement, including its public politics and activities, and not on the basis of private inside information about the bonafides of these friends of yours, whom we do not know."

More on this later; but here we want to point out that the ISL resolution which Shachtman recalled to our memory was not at all indifferent to the political and social nature of the leadership of the movement. It was of the opinion that "in Europe, as in the colonies, the struggle for national independence can be assured against degeneration into a subordinate, an auxiliary, an integral part of the imperialist war--thus depriving it of its progressive significance--only under the leadership of the proletariat." (This, says the resolution, applies to degeneration through take-over by the Stalinist apparatus as by the imperialists.) On the other hand, it says, Anglo-American imperialism is "determined from the very beginning to insure itself against the victory of the people by imposing upon them such tried and true conservatives and reactionaries as are today represented in the various governments in exile and national committees in exile..." (emphasis added). Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

But in imposing the control of conservatives and reactionaries on the movement, it should not be supposed that intelligent imperialists must want to drive out all those Stout Working-Class Fighter types whom we have been meeting. Not in the least; not as long as these latter have no decisive control over the course of the movement and as long as they have lunch with good friends whom they can assure of their bonafides with the utmost sincerity. There are few movements which can do without a left wing of one sort or another; it would leave them positively naked.

VI

The Cuban invasion is not the first such operation that had its left wing of "good people."

For a specialist in selected and stuffed historical precedents, the most interesting period should be that of the imperialist interventions against the Russian Revolution. Of course, these interventions were directed against a socialist regime, and there is no analogy there with the Cuban affair. All we are interested in at this point is the phenomenon of left wings of "good people" (Stout Working-Class Fighters, etc.) in reactionary-dominated movements.

The anti-Soviet interventions came in various shapes and sizes. The Archangel government set up in the North by British guns had at its head not a Cardona but the venerable Tchaikowsky, as stout a fighter for the toiling people as Russia produced. The so-called Ufa government was heavily laden with Mensheviks and SRs, all stout working-class fighters. Even the Kolchak and Denikin forces had their liberal wings, who regularly swore to foreign correspondents that there was no intention to restore the power of the landowners. And so on and so forth.

Now these historical analogies by themselves get us absolutely nowhere; they can be useful and educational only insofar as we clearly understand what question it is we are asking of them. In this case Shachtman sought to impress his audience with his tales of personal acquaintance with certain "good people" in the Cardona coalition. Historical experience advises us that there is a further question to be asked.

He was asked: Why didn't you even raise the question of what weight these good people whom you know have in this Cardona movement? do they have decisive control? any control? etc. ... and in his summary he replied baldly, "I don't know." All he knew was that they were there.

Now even this in itself might have been credible if Shachtman's assurances about his friends were all we had to go on. In view of all that was already known about the relation of the Cardona movement to the U. S., this treatment is -- strange.

In his answer on the "Guatemalan parallel," he satisfied himself very easily with the explanation that he could not support that affair because there were no "good people" involved in the CIA-sponsored coup there. Not even five? not even a pair? Suppose that there had been a wing of honest anti-Stalinist elements who were perturbed by the advances of the Communists in collaboration with Arbenz. For Arbenz did collaborate with the Communists, you know, and gave them power in sectors of his administration--those same devilishly clever Communists who, Shachtman explained, inevitably take over regimes that have no trained, tough opposition forces to stop them. What was there in Guatemala to stop them from taking over the Arbenz regime if the CIA hadn't done its little chore?

And if he had been able to find a few Stout Working-Class Fighters lined up with the invaders in Guatemala, would this have reconciled him to the CIA-organized operation there -- an operation that was not executed by the Marines and not by mercenaries, and which therefore was not U.S. intervention by definition--his definition?

Now as a matter of fact, if Shachtman wants to find out about the left wing of "good people"--not antediluvian reactionaries--who supported the coup of Castillo Armas in Guatemala, he need only read

Daniel James' Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude. The coup got support from "some of the SAMF [railway union] leaders," the Union of Free Workers in Exile (UTLE) who demanded retention of the conquests of the revolution under Arevalo, from progressive student groups, and others who might possibly satisfy Shachtman's requirements for support. Robert Alexander, in Communism in Latin America, even says that Castillo Armas himself was a liberal, though unfortunately surrounded by less appetizing types. Both claim that the C.P. of Guatemala was on the very point of seizing all power and turning the country into a totalitarian satellite of Moscow. Both, too, absolve the U. S. of all intervention, with little pretense of taking up the abundant public evidence.

But Shachtman too, we may notice, did not base his reply on Guatemala on the question of U. S. intervention. For Guatemala too this appears to have disappeared from his consideration. He wants only to be shown a left wing in the Castillo Armas invasion, and he would seem to be ready to wish success to it too, retroactively.

This is what is revelatory about his reply on the Guatemalan parallel.

All this in effect also covers his passing reference to Mikolajczyk in Poland. Of course there were all kinds of elements in the Mikolajczyk movement, as in most others, as there was in the Hungarian revolution, as there will be in every stirring against Stalinist totalitarianism--but we tried to go on the basis of a political analysis of what we conceived to be the primary political character of the movement and its leadership. There is no use discussing this with Shachtman, however, since he is not interested in all that. It is not his method. His wisdom has reached its limits when he finds that there were unpleasant elements here, unpleasant elements there, unpleasant elements in the Cardona council--everything is the same--so let us get on with the real task of fighting Stalinism.

Mikolajczyk's movement was an independent, home-grown force; it had no resemblance to the Cardona appendage to the CIA. Independence from imperialism is the key. It is also the key to what Shachtman has abandoned.

VII

Toward its conclusion the ISL resolution under discussion restated the basic point again: "In the national movements, the question of their general and specific relationships toward Allied imperialism in the war is of vital importance. It is of the same importance to the revolutionary vanguard. ...the revolutionary and proletarian elements must fight tooth and nail in these movements for the attainment of their complete political and organizational independence from the imperialists powers and from alliances with these powers." (Emphasis added.)

This, of course, while you are "taking arms" from them, as long as they are willing to give on these terms.

This is not to say that it is always easy to say definitely when a movement is independent and when it has been taken over; it wasn't in the Second World War. For example, was the ISL's estimate of the Mikhailovich movement correct? That doesn't matter right now. The issue for our present purpose is: What is the question you ask, what is the approach

you apply? For there is no problem of uncertainty about this question in the case of the Cuba invaders: they were not "taken over" by the U.S.; their council and its invasion operation was set up by the U.S. (Of course, before that, the constituent elements had been taken over by Washington.)

All of this applies as well, except doubled in spades, to the case of the "Irish revolutionists" of 1916 as evoked by Shachtman.

Shachtman's history of the Irish uprising of 1916 is in part pure invention. It is not true that the Irish rebels "trained their troops outside of Ireland." These armed bands not only trained in Ireland but did so openly, publicly and legally. The ready reader might get the impression from his reference to "the kaiser's U-boats" that the uprising was made by a band of men who landed from abroad in German submarines (or any other craft). The less malleable historical facts are that a "kaiser's U-boat" (singular) came into the picture when it landed Sir Roger Casement and two companions on the shore, where they were promptly arrested and had nothing to do with the uprising. Nor did the German consul in Dublin lock up the Sinn Fein leadership while he directed the insurrection. Nor....

But this is ridiculous and does not deserve more attention. The Irish uprising of 1916 was as completely independent of the Germans as the Cuban invasion was completely dominated by the U.S. The sole link, as we have said, is that Irish revolutionists accepted and solicited material aid from any quarter, including Germany as the enemy of their enemy, with absolutely no German strings attached, no German control, no German participation, nor any other slightest resemblance to the CIA-organized putsch against Cuba. To link Connolly and Cardona is no service to the revolutionary tradition.

In dealing with the ISL resolution to which Shachtman appealed, we are not mainly interested in whether he still holds with the political thinking of this document (of which he was the main author, by the way; in many ways the best thing he ever wrote). Obviously he does not. A man has a right to leave off the revolutionary follies of his younger years when he becomes a prudent citizen who finally realizes that he is living in this world, as we are told.

But, from an educational point of view, anyone who wants to thread his way through the vexing problem of the relation between the progressive movements of our era and the all-pervading pressure of the rival imperialist camps, should be interested in thinking-through more or less along the lines that we tried to in 1942, whether he reaches similar conclusions or not.

There are many other aspects of the complicated problem taken up there which are not touched on here. It is disconcerting that Shachtman ignores this whole approach, reduces the complexities to the jejune issue of take-arms-or-not--and then reads homilies on his distaste for easy, simple approaches to complex issues.

VIII

There is an entirely different side to the question of arms, besides the one we examined above.

Take, for example, the Spanish Civil War. The Loyalist government needed arms badly and was anxious to get them anywhere. We were for that too, of

course. The Roosevelt government slapped down an embargo on arms to Spain: this meant our side there could not get arms even through private channels. We denounced that and demanded the removal of the embargo. But we as American socialists never called on the U.S. government to go in for giving arms to the Loyalist government.

We could not make this demand because we could not follow through by supporting its reasonable consequences. We were fighting against the outbreak of the then-coming Second World War. Everyone knew it could break out then and there, between the Western alliance and the fascist bloc, over the body of the Spanish war, just as the First World War was triggered by intervention of the rival powers on Serbia. We were against U.S. governmental intervention in the Spanish war because we had no faith in its imperialist policy to intervene for our aims or the Spanish revolution's aims; we knew it could intervene only to beard its rival Germany in the Spanish cockpit.

So there was the situation: It was all right for the Spanish Loyalists to seek and take arms anywhere, including from the U.S. government if they could get them, as a practical arrangement based on independence; this we have already discussed. But at the very same time we American socialists refused to demand from this government that it send arms. This attitude was based solidly, not on an attitude toward the Spanish war, but on our attitude toward our own American imperialism.

The situation was essentially repeated with the Hungarian revolution.

It goes without saying that no one would have dreamt of criticizing the embattled Hungarian workers for taking arms from any hand that offered them, without exception; so much for the question of "taking arms." But at the same time we as American socialists rejected the demand (which was then being raised mainly by reactionaries, as a matter of fact) that the U.S. Air Force air-drop arms to the revolutionists in Budapest.

The immediate reason for this stand was perfectly clear and essentially the same as in the Spanish war: the danger of this course unleashing World War III. We asked those who proposed the air-drop: Are you also prepared to support the Air Force in shooting its way to free airspace over Hungary to execute its mission, or do you turn tail and flee as soon as a Russian plane comes in sight? or do you try to back down at some other point before the Big War starts?

Behind this argument was, also, the same basic consideration: we do not call upon our own imperialist government to send arms because we have no confidence in the progressiveness of its motives, its execution, its consequences, its politics. The issue is still: our attitude toward our own American imperialism, not anything else.

Now we have the Cuba invasion. Shachtman explains that it is all right for the Cardona council to take arms from the U.S. armed forces; very well, we have seen what other issues are involved there, but still they have the right to take arms from anybody.

But Shachtman himself has a problem a little different from his Cuban friends, as an American socialist. Since he sympathizes with the (left wing of the) invasion forces and wishes them success, is he in favor of raising the demand on the U.S. government that it arm or help to arm his friends?

It might seem that this query is answered in advance by the Spanish and Hungarian examples explained above: the answer should be no. But four years ago Shachtman came out against the political position which we had held on the Spanish case and which we took on Hungary. He announced that he now thought it was wrong on Spain, and that he was against applying it to Hungary. At the 1957 ISL convention, the statement on "We do not call on the U.S. government to send arms to Hungary" was adopted by only a narrow majority against the violent opposition of Shachtman, who wished to strike it out.

If he was unwilling to exclude a call for arms to Hungary, where world war might have been precipitated, it is hard to imagine what scruples would restrain him from calling for arms to his friends in the Cardona council...leaving aside, of course, the fact that Washington does not need to be called on to this purpose.

Now of course the issue is not simply whether Washington should give arms to the counter-revolutionaries. The point is to denounce the U.S.'s hip-deep involvement whether by direct troops or by indirect, of which its giving of arms is only a facet. But is it possible for Shachtman, in view of his position, to oppose any U.S. intervention, including indirect intervention? Or will he continue to insist that there was no U.S. intervention--which means to say, no kind of intervention that he is ready to dissociate himself from?

As in the case of the Spanish and Hungarian cases examined, the underlying issue there is not Cuba but attitude toward our own American imperialism. As was pointed out at the beginning, this is the issue in this entire discussion.

IX

Shachtman's definition of "intervention" by the U.S. is, however, very Pickwickian.

In his Berkeley speech he denied that Washington's participation in the affair amounted to "armed intervention," which he defined as follows: "a force that is not Cuban in any way, which is purely mercenary, which reaches the most extreme and obvious form so that even the biggest dunderhead in the world can see it if it sends the U.S. Marines there, let us say."

It is true that if Kennedy sends the U.S. Marines into Cuba, not even the biggest dunderhead will be able to blink the fact that armed intervention has taken place. But if this is the extreme and obvious form, what is the form of U.S. intervention which is more subtle? If even the biggest dunderhead can see that kind, what kind ought to be discernible to socialists?

The actual participation of U.S. armed forces in the training and transportation of the invaders, planning and supply of the attack, radio communication and propaganda broadcasts on behalf of the invasion, and various other services, has been ascertained. But Kennedy, Stevenson et al. deny there was any U.S. intervention since no U.S. troops landed. Will Shachtman still, today, insist on his denial?

This question must be asked because Shachtman presents himself as being against U.S. intervention. "Hands off Cuba," he says, and this phrase usually means a little more than refraining from sending in the Marines (in uniform). He is not only opposed to intervention but "irreconcilably" opposed to it, he

says. This laudable asseveration loses some of its luster, however, if he denies the reality of intervention as energetically as Adlai Stevenson unless you can show that either the Marines have landed singing Caissons Away or that the invaders are "purely mercenary."

X

Insofar as Shachtman indicates that the result of the invasion (uncertain as he spoke) would be a reflection of where the Cuban people stood--and unacceptable as is this theory of the invasion as a sort of "plebiscite"--it is possible to wonder what effect the outcome has had on his own perspective.

He sees the inevitable totalitarianization of the Castro regime as a result of victory. And, to be sure, the Castro regime may wind up going far in this direction, although I do not think it is inevitable at all. The Castro regime has been and is being pushed into the arms of the C.P. and of the Moscow camp and into increasingly anti-democratic forms and practices. What is pushing it?

Nothing else but the U.S. itself, together with the operations of its Cuban friends. Shachtman does not deny this, I believe. It is not the Cuban C.P. that could do this job, devilishly clever as it is in holding out its arms to receive Castro as he gets pushed. It is not Castro himself, because Shachtman agrees he is not a Communist. It is not the Russians who are pulling Castro into their orbit by his shirt-tail. It is the interventionist policy of the U.S., then, that is pushing Cuba toward intensified authoritarianism and a pro-Moscow orientation. By the same token, it is the operations of the CIA's Cuban vassals, and all their supporters.

Strange dénouement! It is Shachtman's type of policy which is pushing Castro toward Stalinism, and it is Shachtman who comes before us crying that we must support this type of policy in order to save Cuba from the horrors of Stalinism! But despite appearances, all is really in order here, for this has been the self-destructing characteristic of American foreign policy in this whole cold war.

So it is not Castro's victory over the invasion that rigidifies the Cuban regime; it is the intensified threat of U.S. intervention, coming after the invasion crisis, proclaimed by Kennedy's club-brandishing speech of April 20.

Try this test in your political imagination: Suppose all threats of intervention were quashed, really quashed, and it was made clear to the Cuban people that they were no longer under the mountainous pressure of the Northern colossus. Suppose, to implement this, the U.S. also ceased to put the economic screws on Cuba and renegotiated its trade and other relations. Suppose it gave Cuba substantial economic and financial aid; etc. All imperialist pressure on the little island is removed: Would it be easier or harder for the "devilishly" clever C.P. to continue its job of taking over the regime? Would it be easier or harder to convince more and more people, supporters of Castro, that thereought to be elections now? Would it be easier or harder to mobilize sentiment in Cuba for a return to the democratic revolutionary perspective -- and to mobilize it both legally and, if necessary, otherwise? If the U.S. offered a real hand of friendship and aid, would the devilish C.P. be able to prevent the people from accepting, or even prevent Castro from accepting--without ruining his halo? ... Follow this train of thought

along in some detail, and ask: Isn't this the only certain and sure way to stop the devilish Stalinists?

I am not saying we American socialists can be sure of bringing this about, but only this: that insofar as we have voices to raise, we raise them to push in this direction, no other.

But is this compatible with maintenance of a line of support for the Cardona outfit or any wing of it?

I raise this as a matter of political position. I do not know whether anything at all is left of the Cardona operation or what the Ray group and the others intend to do now, if they still exist. But for Shachtman the question is: Shall I discuss with my friends, or those whose credentials I have checked, how to do the same job better next time, i.e. how to continue to keep the outside pressure hot on Castro?

How reconcile a policy directed to easing the Northern pressure on Cuba, with justification of what the invaders have done and may try to do again, only more effectively?

If it is victories that consolidate totalitarianism in Cuba, how can Shachtman justify pressing the U.S. to give Castro more victories--by getting out of Guantanamo, giving economic aid, renewing diplomatic relations, etc.? It is good and a thing of cheer that Shachtman raises these demands, in spite of his unfortunate position; this does him honor. But it points to an entirely different road--the road to the defeat of Stalinism through a reconciliation with the Castro regime, not the road of intervention.

This is particularly the responsibility of U.S. socialists. It may be that if we were Cubans, inside Cuba, we would all be together in a common opposition to the Castro regime; maybe, but that is not the problem which this discussion is trying to solve. What we can try to work out is how we, as U.S. socialists, can help the perspective of such a democratic revolutionary opposition sentiment in Cuba. From this point of view, if any significant section of American socialism had staggered into the position of supporting the invasion, it would have been a terrible disaster. As it was, the damage was strictly limited.

So what Shachtman must choose now is between the perspective implied by his good demands for a U.S. reconciliation with the Castro regime, and the perspective implied by his support of the invasion.

A good deal more important is the fact that this is how the problem is posed before all socialists. It is only the current form of the worldwide problem before socialism: how to fight for a democratic foreign policy in opposition to Western capitalist imperialism; how to fight for freedom everywhere in opposition to Stalinist imperialism and its agents.

Behind the two views on the Cuban invasion, then, are raised all the problems of a Third Camp opposition to both war blocs as against any kind of critical support to the American (or Western) camp. These problems are many and various, and cannot be discussed here, but if these comments lead into further discussion of the Third Camp approach to world politics, their limited aim has been sufficiently accomplished.

May 5, 1961

FIVE QUESTIONS ON THE CUBAN INVASION

3

Now that the CIA-organized invasion of Cuba has come to an inglorious end, President Kennedy's speech of April 20 has publicly admitted that he is heading toward open military intervention in Cuba by the forces of the U. S. — in violation of all promises, pledges, international agreements and morality.

Anyday now, the headlines may announce that U. S. troops are doing in Cuba what the troops of the Moscow despotism did in Hungary.

"Should that time ever come," said Kennedy, "we do not intend to be lectured on 'intervention' by those whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest."

VERY WELL; BUT YOU WHO DENOUNCED THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY — WHAT WILL YOU SAY TO KENNEDY?

1

Did you denounce the Russian intervention because the wrong people were doing it, or because you defended Hungary's right to settle its own fate?

Did you argue—then, when the world's conscience revolted at the Kremlin's brutal act — that the Russians had a "right" to that deed if their "national security" demanded it? Did you argue, then, that the Russians had the "right" to impose a "better" government on another people, with tanks?

NO, KENNEDY NEED NOT PAY ATTENTION TO THE HYPOCRITICAL PROTESTS OF THE TOTALITARIANS WHO DID THERE WHAT HE PLANS TO DO HERE. BUT YOU—ARE YOU GOING TO PROTEST THIS CRIME CONTEMPLATED BY YOUR OWN GOVERNMENT, YOU WHO PROTESTED THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE OTHER SIDE IN THE COLD WAR?

2

Do you think the issue in this projected intervention is for-or-against Castro?

We democratic socialists are not admirers or political supporters of either Castro or his regime.

But in 1935, when Italy invaded the slaveholding state of Ethiopia (naturally, in the name of civilization and progress) — was the issue for-or-against the regime of Haile Selassie? Was it for-or-against slaveholding? Didn't all democrats defend even this Ethiopia against foreign aggression?

And in 1948, when Russia broke with Tito and threatened daily to march into Yugoslavia and whip it into line: was the issue, then, for-or-against Tito, who was himself a totalitarian dictator? Did defense of Yugoslavia (even Tito's Yugoslavia) against foreign dictation mean approval of Tito's regime?

The issue in this U. S. intervention is NOT for-or-against Castro.

WHATEVER YOU THINK OF CASTRO'S REGIME, CAN YOUR CONSCIENCE REMAIN SILENT WHEN YOUR OWN GOVERNMENT MOVES INTO THE POSITION OF A FOREIGN AGGRESSOR IMPOSING ITS OWN WISHES BY CLUBBING A WEAKER PEOPLE?

Do you think Washington is doing this because the government is so outraged by Castro's lack of democracy? Is it democracy Washington wants to defend in Cuba?

We democratic socialists are deeply concerned by the issue of democracy for the masses of Cuban people. We are NOT admirers or political supporters of Castro because he is helping to undo the Cuban people's revolution by his denial of democratic institutions, by his gutting of trade-union independence, by his rejection of elections, by his toleration of Communist Party domination in many fields. Our sympathies lie with all those in Cuba who are seeking to save the Cuban revolution from Castro's course, within the framework of the Cuban revolution itself.

But support of U. S. intervention — either directly as Kennedy threatens, or indirectly as just been attempted — is a body-blow to the Cuban revolution.

WAS WASHINGTON UPSET ABOUT LACK OF DEMOCRACY IN CUBA WHEN IT WAS SUPPORTING AND ARMING THE BATISTA DICTATORSHIP?

If Washington is so outraged by lack of democracy under Castro, how does it maintain its calm at the spectacle of the bloody despotism of Trujillo in the Caribbean? Why has it never put its "democratic" CIA operatives and Nicaraguan training fields and secret funds at the disposal of the democratic refugees from Trujillo's terror?

If Washington's aims were to bestow democracy upon the Cubans, why did the CIA organizers of the counter-revolution funnel their aid to the reactionary right wing of the invasion forces, while throttling aid to other invasion groups suspected of favoring retention of some of the social and economic gains of the Cuban revolution?

IN OUR TIMES, EVERY INTERVENTION TO MAINTAIN IMPERIALIST DOMINATION OF A SMALLER PEOPLE HAS BEEN CARRIED THROUGH UNDER THE MASK OF DEMOCRATIC CLAIMS. SO IT WAS IN HUNGARY, SUEZ, GUATEMALA, ALGERIA, TIBET, ETC. DO YOU THINK YOU CAN ACCEPT THESE CLAIMS AS GENUINE NO MATTER WHAT SIDE OF THE IRON CURTAIN THEY COME FROM?

4

Is Washington intervening to club Cuba because Castro has "betrayed the Cuban revolution," as Kennedy's White Paper claimed?

Is Kennedy threatening to move against Cuba because Castro has betrayed his revolutionary promises, and NOT because the Cuban revolution has sent the landowners packing, hit the profits of the American oil companies, expropriated the sugar planters who leached the island's economy, and nationalized Cuban property of U. S. financial and commercial interests?

Please explain this to yourself before cheering for Kennedy's armed 'defense of democracy' in Cuba:

WHY WAS IT THAT IN THIS VERY WHITE PAPER WHICH PRESENTS THE POLITICAL PLATFORM AND RATIONALE FOR U. S. INTERVENTION, CONSPICUOUSLY MISSING IS

ANY PLEDGE THAT THE U. S. WILL NOT USE FORCE TO REIMPOSE THE SWAY OF THE DOLLAR INTERESTS, WILL NOT USE ITS POWER TO OVERTURN THE REAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC GAINS WHICH HAVE BEEN WON BY THE CUBAN PEOPLE SO FAR?

It would have been so easy for the Kennedy government to have allayed all fears of its intentions, all "mis-understandings" of its aims, all "accusations" of imperialism! If a pledge was too much to ask, why didn't the White Paper just include a statement to this effect?

To be even more reasonable about it: the statement need not even have been honestly meant. It would have been cheap enough to throw in some words.

BUT THERE IS NOTHING OF THE SORT. DOES ANYONE NOW REALLY DOUBT THAT A VICTORY FOR THE U. S.-SPONSORED COUNTER-REVOLUTION WOULD HAVE MEANT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESTORATION OF THE OLD RULE OF THE FINANCIAL AND AGRARIAN INTERESTS?

5

Is Washington forced to intervene against Cuba because it cannot permit the establishment of a "Russian military base" there? Is that the issue?

James Reston, head of the Washington bureau of the N. Y. Times, stated flatly in an April 5 dispatch:

"This Administration is not acting on the assumption that the Soviet Union wants to establish a missile or military base in Cuba. Any such attempt would undoubtedly be met directly with military intervention by the U. S. What is afoot is an effort to set up a Communist *political base*, backed with enough force to exploit the weakness of other governments throughout the Caribbean and Central America and create a serious *political diversion* for the U. S. in the Western Hemisphere." (Emphasis added.)

What is a "*political base*"? We know what a military base is, in this cold war. Reston explained on April 23: "Turkey, for example, has been getting from the U. S. far more power than Castro ever dreamed of getting from the Russians. This U. S. power, including even rockets with nuclear warheads, has been situated in Turkey for a long time, but the Russians, while annoyed by this fact, have not felt obliged to use their power to invade Turkey."

WE KNOW FULL WELL THAT MOSCOW WOULD LIKE TO DO TO TURKEY WHAT KENNEDY IS PLANNING TO DO TO CUBA. BUT YOU, WHO GET INDIGNANT ABOUT MOSCOW'S CRIMES, WHAT HAVE YOU TO SAY ABOUT THE NEW DOCTRINE WHICH SEEMS TO PROCLAIM THAT COMMUNIST "POLITICAL BASES" (whatever those are) MUST BE WIPED OUT BY U. S. MILITARY INVASIONS WHENEVER THE U. S. CAN GET AWAY WITH IT?

As this is written, the press reports that President Kennedy has gotten advance approval for intervention plans from Nixon, Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater and other leading devotees of democracy in both major parties. But will America's liberals go along with this disastrous course?

So far that picture has been bad. The whole political cover-up for the CIA-organized invasion was scripted for the White Paper by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. While Rusk and Bowles were reported against the adventure, Adolf A. Berle was for it, according to the N. Y. Times account. And in the UN, Adlai Stevenson made the required perjured speeches about the pristine innocence of the Kennedy government, reports of which appeared side by side with the detailed press accounts of how —

"As has been an open secret in Florida and Central America for months, the CIA planned, co-ordinated and directed the operations that ended in the defeat on a beachhead in southern Cuba Wednesday."

(N. Y. Times, April 22)

NEITHER AMERICAN LIBERALS NOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL BE MOVED TO ACTION BY ANY WHITEWASH-DEFENSE OF THE CASTRO REGIME. INDEED, THE INTERVENTIONISTS WOULD LIKE TO KEEP THE ISSUE IN TERMS OF A SIMPLE CHOICE BETWEEN AN APPROVAL OF U. S. INTERVENTION ON THE ONE HAND OR AN UNCRITICAL APOLOGIA FOR CASTRO ON THE OTHER.

We have pointed here to a third approach — the only approach, we think, consistent with democracy and political morality.

It is also, we are convinced, the only approach which can successfully counter not only the war camp on this side of the Iron Curtain but also the advance of the Communist war camp in this world. Even a "successful" Kennedy attack on Cuba would be a smashing political and moral victory for the Kremlin among all the peoples of the world.

We need a government in this country which can follow a DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY, instead of the policy of an imperialist bully.

"I am determined" — so went Kennedy's last words in his April 20 speech — "upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril."

Ominous words! But most of the peoples of the world do NOT want to choose between the capitalist system which Kennedy has in mind, and the system of bureaucratic-collectivist totalitarianism which is the rival candidate for world domination put forward by the Kremlin.

Instead of pushing peoples into the arms of the Communists — as Castro has been pushed toward the waiting arms of the Communists by Washington's reactionary pressure — a DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY could consolidate the irrepressible world revolution that is going on along democratic and progressive lines, instead of presenting it with the evil alternatives of capitulation to imperial Capital or Imperial Communism.

The responsibility for getting a democratic foreign policy is yours. Now is the time to raise your voice.

You owe it to decency and honesty to speak up, in order to stop a U. S.-organized "Hungary" in the Caribbean.

In Russia and Hungary in 1956, enemies of the Russian invasion risked concentration camp, torture and death if they spoke up. YOU HAVE IT EASY: you don't have to be a dedicated hero to do as much here and now . . .

PROTEST AGAINST THE PLANNED INTERVENTION IN CUBA!

WRITE OR TELEGRAPH KENNEDY AND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS!

Get in touch with us and help us carry on this campaign. Your aid is vital.

By Hal Draper
April 25, 1961

Published by

BAY AREA YOUNG PEOPLES SOCIALIST LEAGUE
2431 Dwight Way, Berkeley
LOCAL EAST BAY SOCIALIST PARTY — S. D. F.
1978 California Street, Berkeley

By Tad Szulc
New York Times
(S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 22)

As has been an open secret in Florida and Central America for months, the CIA planned, co-ordinated and directed the operations that ended in the defeat on a beachhead in southern Cuba Wednesday.

The principal charge leveled at the CIA by Cubans from numerous groups is that it precipitated the attack without adequate co-ordination with the underground and despite urgent warnings in recent weeks against such an attempt.

The agency is also blamed for excluding from the operations several rebel groups—which include a number of experienced guerrilla officers—because of alleged favoritism for other factions for political reasons.

The Cuban pilots were trained by at least seven U.S. pilots belonging to a F-104 jet fighter group.

The bulk of the troops were trained for forming a conventional army, using tanks, mortars and bazookas. A U. S. army colonel commanded the training.

Special guerrilla forces were trained at one or two of the camps, and some of the Cuban officers were sent to the U. S. Army's jungle warfare school in Panama.

A Filipino guerrilla specialist, a Colonel Vallejo, was in charge of some of the guerrilla training. He was assisted by five or six instructors who are believed to be Slavs, perhaps Ukrainians, and who were assisted by interpreters.

When the revolutionary council ordered a purge of men who were once supporters of the former dictator, Fulgencio Batista, CIA agents were reported to be reluctant to give up trained personnel to satisfy political requirements.

Charges were constantly heard in Miami that Batista supporters held high positions in the camps. Ten days before the landings a gun battle was reported to have occurred in one of them.

Early last week, however, the preparation for a landing went into high gear just as a major sabotage campaign began in Cuba. These last-minute preparations were kept a secret from the underground organizations not favored by the CIA.

The invading force was reported to have jumped off, among other points, from the

islands of Great Corn and Little Corn, off the coast of Nicaragua.

The islands belong to Nicaragua, but they have been on a 99-year lease to the U. S. since 1916.

One of the important criticisms of the landing operation was that it was not accompanied by broadcasts into Cuba urging the people to rise and informing them who was leading the attack. This, it was stressed, left Cubans in a state of uncertainty and confusion, compounded by broadcasts by Radio Swan, a CIA-operated propaganda station on Swan Island, claiming victories and uprisings that were not actually happening.

N.Y. Times dispatch in S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 26

New York Times Service

WASHINGTON, April 25—On the day of the landings in Cuba of the anti-Castro forces, members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council were kept incommunicado by the Central Intelligence Agency in an old house near Miami, Fla.

This was acknowledged today by official sources here who described the action as a security measure.

The effect of the failure to take the Revolutionary Council leaders into confidence was to keep them from having any role in directing the landings and from co-ordinating the effort with the underground in Cuba.

According to details of the story as they became known today, members of the Revolutionary Council, including its president, Jose Miro Cardona, were in New York the day before the invasion when they received word to go to Philadelphia. From there they were flown to Miami.

The Revolutionary Council leaders, including Defense Minister Antonio De Varona and Manuel Ray, were kept from using the phone or from communicating with anyone outside. They were permitted to listen to the radio and heard communiques on the April 17 landings put out in their name.

Enraged, several of the council members announced they were leaving even if it meant being shot by the armed guards. They reached a telephone and called Adolph A. Berle, President Kennedy's co-ordinator of Latin-America policies.

As a result, informants said, Berle and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. flew to Miami before dawn Wednesday

morning to hear the Exiles' story.

Reassured by the two officials, the Revolutionary leaders were brought to Washington Wednesday for a secret meeting with Presi-

Same story in N.Y. Post, Apr. 25

"They were not permitted to join the rebel forces or speak in their own name. Statements were issued in their behalf of which they had no knowledge.

"The Cuban exile leaders first heard of the invasion from radio news bulletins on Monday. The timing of the operation caught at least some of them off-guard. It provided no opportunity to work out plans with the underground inside Cuba to set off sabotage and diversionary incidents.

"The coordinator of the Cuban underground had a few days earlier journeyed from the island to Miami in order to make such plans. The invasion caught him flatfooted and as a result, there was no sabotage or uprising. Some of the Cuban exiles blame the CIA for this failure. The CIA explanation is that it did not entirely trust the underground and chose not to rely upon it.

S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 19

NEW YORK, April 18 (AP)—American businessmen, hoping to regain some of the billion dollars in properties lost to Fidel Castro's government, watched the fighting in Cuba today with intense interest.

"We're just sitting and waiting. We're completely in the dark," said an officer of American & Foreign Power Co., which saw \$300 million in property nationalized by the Castro regime.

"We're playing it by ear," said a spokesman for W. R. Grace & Co., which lost a \$1.5 million paper converting mill on the outskirts of Havana.

In Boston, a vice president of the United Fruit Co. said a \$70 million claim would be filed with any new government that might depose Castro.

"If a new and democratic government succeeds," he said, "United Fruit Co. would hope to play a part in the economy."

Freeport Sulphur Co., which had invested \$61.5 million in a mining operation, said, "We'll just have to see what type of new government may develop" when questioned about possible future operations in Cuba.

ALBERT M. COLEGROVE, Scripps-Howard columnist, looks for allies to bring Democracy to Cuba:

But at this moment, it's highly doubtful any Latin American nation would give us substantial armed backing in Cuba.

Three small countries (out of 20) might offer bases and token forces of a few hundred men: Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador.

These nations represent fewer than eight million people out of Latin America's 175 million.

They could send only token forces because the anti-Communist governments of these three nations wouldn't dare drain the strengths of their home armies—for fear of revolutions in their own back yards while the troops were away.

Similar fears, of bloody uprising at home if they lift a finger to help Uncle Sam, are likely to prevent assistance by the pro-U. S. leaders of several Latin countries. To name a few: Panama, Peru, Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.

S.F. Chronicle editorial, Apr. 26 recalls a lesson in politics:

It is not enough to tell the Cubans they are living under a police state, for Batista's was a police state, and Castroism, we mustn't forget, is preferable to Batistaism if you happen to be one of those who was hungry under Batista and has been better fed under Castro.

So, badly planned were the preparations for last week's landings that one can only imagine how bad was the planning for what was to come after it if the revolt had succeeded. Yet an about-to-be-disaffected Cuban first wants to know what you are bringing ashore. This is fundamental to political warfare—one of several fundamentals the CIA evidently forgot.

GUY WRIGHT, Scripps-Howard columnist, does some wondering (S.F. News-Call-Bull., Apr. 25)

Another matter we've overlooked in our eagerness to be rid of Castro is the kind of government that would replace him. Can anyone say who the new boss-man of Cuba would be?

Is it any wonder that the Cubans, even those who dislike Castro, didn't rush forth to risk their lives in such an ambiguous cause? A man likes to know what he's fighting against. Even better, he likes to know what he's fighting for.

Drew Pearson
S.F. Chronicle, May 3

For the invasion fleet the CIA purchased a couple of mofley LCIs (landing craft infantry). These were manned by defectors from the Cuban navy but commanded by hired American merchant officers.

Some of these hired heroes turned out to be drunks. Others were actually anti-Cuban.

BEFORE THE INVASION

S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 5 "WHY KENNEDY WANTS A CUBA SHOWDOWN NOW"

By James B. Reston
New York Times Service

This Administration is not acting on the assumption that the Soviet Union wants to establish a missile or military base in Cuba. Any such attempt would undoubtedly be met directly with military intervention by the U. S.

POLITICAL

What is afoot is an effort to set up a Communist political base, backed with enough force to exploit the weakness of other governments throughout the Caribbean and Central America and create a serious political diversion for the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

N.Y. Times, April 7

For nearly nine months Cuban exile military forces...have been training in the United States as well as in Central America...the external forces...are now concentrated at two major camps in Guatemala and at a base in Louisiana...Since last fall the training has been centralized under the direction of a united Cuban political command...It has enjoyed the tolerance and the active cooperation of United States officials.

Washington Post, Apr. 15

The multi-million-dollar training program for thousands of anti-Castro volunteers in Central America is costing \$17,000 a day simply to maintain the four or five main bases. Untold additional thousands of dollars are being spent daily to recruit in the U.S., outfit, equip and transport the raw rookies to their training quarters...Where the money is coming from remains a closely guarded secret.



The cartoon below
is not from PRAVDA,
but from Knowland's
OAKLAND TRIBUNE
April 21
where it appeared
under the title of
"PROFILE IN COURAGE"



From speech by Rep. Kowalski (D., Conn.)
in Congress, April 27:

"... other invasions of Cuba are coming. Who will be the invaders? Reliable sources have suggested that they will be Social Democrats. Each one of us will have his own views of what is a Social Democrat, but it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. will support Cuban patriots with liberal views. The invaders can be expected to support progressive social and land reform programs. The fundamental political objective of the invaders will be to reestablish freedom and democracy in Cuba.

"The last invasion failed to communicate its objectives to the people of Cuba; and future invasions, I regret to observe, will have the same difficulties. For in a popularity contest in Cuba, Castro is the hero. It was Castro who seized the sugar lands. It was Castro who seized the banks and factories from foreigners and wealthy Cubans. It was Castro who seized the imagination of the Cuban people.

"As Americans, we hope patriots will find a way to ignite the spark of desire for freedom which could destroy Castro, but I doubt that the peons and the bearded ones can really understand the noble intricacies of a social democratic counter revolution. I must reluctantly conclude that in any future invasion as in the past one, they will remain loyal to Castro."

--I.F.Stone's Weekly, May 8

by Francis B. Stevens

In Government circles in Washington, some talk is now heard of possible action against Castro in terms of self-defense, not intervention. This has important legal implications. International law recognizes the right of every sovereign state to act in self-defense against outside aggression. This was precisely the motivation for Soviet action in crushing the Hungarian rebellion in 1956. A hostile, non-Communist regime was considered to be a threat to the security of the Soviet Union, and as such could not be tolerated.

THIS NEW EMPHASIS ON SELF-DEFENSE is an indication of the seriousness with which the Administration views the situation resulting from the failure of the invasion attempt to dislodge Castro.

That ill-starred venture revealed several facts which were either unknown or disbelieved in Washington. Castro was shown to have military forces sufficiently strong and disciplined to deal with incursions by irregulars. His police apparatus was able to repress any show of sympathy by the population for the invaders, and to maintain internal order. And the invaders were exposed as ideologically bankrupt; their program of anti-Castroism was insufficient to arouse support among the masses who have fed at the Castro trough and whose help is essential in any effort to overthrow the regime from within.

Hence the quandary in which the President finds himself. There is now little hope that the anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba can gain their ends without solid military support from outside the country. That support can come only from the U. S.

The President obviously wishes to avoid an American Hungary which would bring down on the U. S. the wrath of the world and jeopardize his entire foreign policy. But he cannot tolerate indefinitely the cancer of Communism in the Caribbean. In the final analysis, great powers will take whatever steps they consider necessary to guard their national security.

—U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 15, 1961

by KEITH WHEELER

LIFE Staff Writer

...or both. The responsibility lay upon agencies of the U.S. government—notably upon the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CIA fostered the invasion on the mistaken assumption that Castro was too weak to prevent it and that masses of Cubans were ready to rise up against him. The JCS approved the strategy, picked the beach and predicted success for the venture.

Nevertheless, with U.S. financing the *Frente* began to get things done. Political delegations were dispatched to every Latin American country to counteract Castro's pervasive propaganda. Some of the *Frente's* deeds were in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition. In Lima, Peru, agents staged a bold daylight stick-up of the Cuban embassy and came away with secret documents demonstrating such blatant Cuban meddling in Peruvian affairs that Peru broke off relations with Havana. In Miami agents burglarized the Cuban consulate and turned up the identification cards of 17 Castro spies then operating in the U.S.

More to the point, the *Frente* began recruiting volunteers to be trained as an anti-Castro army. Enlistment centers were set up in Miami.

--LIFE, Apr. 28